

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (translation)

Deponent : ISHIHARA Kanji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I was in charge of operations as a staff-officer of the Kwantung Army from March, 1929 to August, 1932, and concerned with the Manchurian Incident which was touched off by the Mukden Incident in September, 1931. So I shall state hereby on the actions of the Kwantung Army at that time, laying stress on its military movements, as they relate to the Manchurian Incident.

(1) On the general situation with special reference to the military position of Japan before the Manchurian Incident.

At the time when Japan obtained the right to station her troops in Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese forces in four north-eastern provinces were so meager that Japan could manage to defend the far-stretching South Manchuria Railway and also to protect her residents with the small force allowed by the treaty. But after the collapse of Ching Dynasty, it happened that <sup>Chang Tsao-lin</sup> grew powerful and started to have an ambitious eye to things within the Great Walls, gradually increasing his forces. His policy in Manchuria was influenced by the campaign for recovery of lost national rights then prevailing all over China and tended to aim at driving out the Russo-Japanese influences from Manchuria. So the movement of his forces became a considerable factor in considering Manchurian affairs.

After Chang Tsao-lin was killed by bombs, his successor, Chang Hsui-liang declared his allegiance to the Kuomintang. So, the Kuomintang influence

REF ID: A686

made a steady inroad on the north-eastern area, instigating and organising anti-Japanese campaigns, until it affected the North-eastern Army, the importance of which could no longer be disregarded.

Chang Hsueh-liang was appointed Vice-commander of the Kuomintang Army upon his declaration of allegiance to the Nanking government. He attempted to re-organize his forces, and to reinforce their armaments in both quantity and quality namely, maintenance of a standing strength amounting to 220,000, enlargement of the munitions factory in Mukden, equipping his forces with tanks, airplanes and other modern arms, and strengthening of training systems etc. They were superior in numbers and equipment to our forces in Manchuria at that time, and were in high spirits with elated anti-Japanese sentiments. Their disposition was re-arranged into an encircling position so that they besiege those areas occupied by our army along the South Manchuria Railway. In the face of such a challenging attitude, the Kwantung Army scattered in an extensive area was placed in a dangerous position from a military point of view. Organized actions against or in contempt of Japan were committed under the leadership of the North-Eastern army authorities while our railway-guards were on duty or in training. In the face of various kinds of successive interruptions and accidents, and the distress and misery from which the Japanese residents <sup>our</sup> suffered, the Kwantung Army was driven to the extreme limit of indignation.

In order to cope with the threatening situation produced by the change of military conditions in general in the north-eastern China, the Kwantung Army in the field made a proposal to increase the numbers and re-arrange its forces to the central military authorities. However, it was not accepted. So the Japanese forces remaining in its peace-time disposition, had

to be exposed to the superior Chinese forces burning with anti-Japanese sentiments: on the other hand, no effective diplomatic steps were taken except the lip service to alleviate the situation. The relation between the two forces was on the verge of explosion as if sitting on top of a volcano.

(2) On the outline of operational preparations by the Kwantung Army at the time of the Incident.

Besides its usual duty of guarding the South Manchuria Railway and also of defending the Kwantung Province, the Kwantung Army was in charge of

covering the concentration of our main forces in Manchuria, in the possible event of hostilities between Soviet Russia and Japan, which might be touched of by the Soviet encroachment on the Manchurian territory. a duty in view, which, of course, were of Necessary preparations were always made for such a defensive nature as to expect to give a blow at the advancing enemy in the northern part of South Manchuria in case the enemy should attack the south after occupying the northern areas. So the Chinese army was not our original objective of operational preparations. But, as previously stated, the north-eastern situation was steadily growing worse and finally it came to be feared that the Chinese army burning with anti-Japanese sentiments might clash with our forces. So, according to the orders and instructions received from the central headquarters of supreme command preparations for the worst had been made for the preceding several years in order to execute the duty even by force. Our ill-equipped forces of about 10,000 remained at that time in their usual disposition, dispersed along about 1,000 K.m. of the South Manchuria Railway line south of Changchun, encircled by the Chinese forces of 200,000. strength. There were thousands or tens of thousand of Chinese forces stationed in Mukden. Changchun, Chuangte and Fengwang-cheng, and the commander's notice was posted in every barrack of the Wang I-che's Brigade announcing his firm resolution against Japan to stir up hostile feelings. Under such circumstances the Kwantung Army established an operational plan to settle whatever incident might happen, in the shortest possible time and finished all the preparations regarding education, training, transportation etc. Our tactics were to forestall the enemy, concentrating all our strength to Mukden to deal a fatal blow to the military centre of Mukden and the pick of the North-eastern Army if our main forces should be

obliged to take actions in the conflict between Japan and China regardless of the place of the conflict.

It required a scrupulous planning and preparation, a strong unity and careful training of troops to discharge this difficult duty with so small a force available. So, every unit was required to maintain strict discipline and strong unity and to conduct education and training to the point and adaptable to actual fightings.

When Commander HONJO replaced General HISHIKARI in August, 1931, he understood the gravity of the situation in view of the Captain NAKAMURA's Case, Wan-pao-shan affair and other conflicts in connection with the guard duty. So he issued an order to the effect that his forces should abstain from rashness and impatience on the one hand, and on the other hand should take a positive and resolute action in discharging their duties, especially in the case of a small unit once a clash with the enemy actually occurs.

should not allow the enemy to aggrandize the incident by despising us. In his first inspection tour following his arrival at his post the command simultaneously undertook an unexpected inspection with especial reference to the operational preparations of every unit. As the Kwantung Army was inferior in point of numbers and equipment, and was so situated as to expect no re-inforcement from the central military authorities, it tried to increase its fighting strength by making the most of operational materials available in Manchuria. For example, two heavy-guns were mounted on the 2nd Battalion's Barrack of the Mukden Independent Garrison, several armored cars were attached to a part of infantry forces, and explosive provisions and other wall-attack materials were prepared. It is true that it endeavored to make up the shortage of the fighting strength, but it was

Def. Doc. # 886

not in a position to carry out extensive operations for a long time. As to the transportation of the forces, we had the confidence in our ability to start it about an hour after the alarm was received, but, I regret to say that it took in actuality about four hours at the very moment of the incident. In view of the superiority of the enemy in its armaments, especially in mortar, tank or airplane, our forces devoted themselves to the training in our favorite night or wall-attack, with such intensity as to develop a fighting spirit strong enough to meet the opposing forces however great the odds might be.

(3) On the relation between the operational preparations of the Kwantung Army and the outsiders.

At the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the Commander of the Kwantung Army was Lieutenant-general HONJO, Shigeru, who, as previously stated, succeeded General HISHIKARI in August, 1931. The chief of staff was Major-general NIYAKE, Koji, the senior staff-officer was Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro, who succeeded Colonel KAWAMOTO after the latter was obliged to be transferred following the death of Chang Tsuo-lin by bombing: the operational staff-officer was myself. There were also some other staff officers of the ranks of major or captains.

The chief of the Mukden Special Service Organ was Colonel DOHARA, Kenji, who succeeded Major-general SUZUKI, Yoshimichi in August, 1931, and the military adviser of Chang Hsui-liang was Lieutenant-colonel SHIBAYAMA, Kenshiro. There were also some other military instructors engaged by the North-eastern Army. The Commander of the 2nd Division was Lieutenant-general TAMON, Jiro, and the commander of the Independent Garrison was Lieutenant-general MORI, Ren. None of these officers had



Def. Doc. # 886

any connection with the so-called "March Incident", nor were they the members of the SAKURA (Cherry) Association. I had no opportunity to have intimate talks with Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro or Doctor OKAWA, Shumei before the Manchurian Incident. As, sharp criticisms were made in Japan concerning the actions of the Kwantung Army, especially after the death of Chang Tsuo-lin, the leaders of the Kwantung Army, including the former commanders, General HISHIKARI and General HATA (Eishiro), gave the forces a strict warning against rash actions. Colonel ITAGAKI, in particular as the senior staff-officer, had a Perfect-Control over the headquarters' staff officers, so he was confident that no one would dare to attempt an irregular conduct. But, in view of the anti-Japanese atmosphere in China, especially of her troops' hostile feelings and insubordinate movements, and also in the face of the failure of various diplomatic negotiations between Japan and China inspite of our conciliatory attitude the whole army, including its commander, staff officers, force-commanders, officers and men entertained the idea that an armed conflict was inevitable. So the Kwantung Army continued to study, in such great earnest, its peculiar operational preparations for the worst, as well as the measures to be taken in order to maintain peace and order, that there was no staff-officer in the headquarters at Fort Arthur who was absent on private business, even on Sundays. All the units did their best day and night in training and execution of their guard duties.

When the so-called "October Incident" took place after the Manchurian Incident, it was suspected in Tokyo that the Kwantung Army might declare independence and that troubles might be caused in concert with the Kwantung Army. Telegrams in violent tones were received, and General SHIRAKAWA came to Manchuria to appease the army. But the forces in the field which

were quietly striving to do their duties could not help sneering at the confusion in the central authorities. It is true that there were some civilians in the South Manchurian Railway and other circles, who had various opinions on the Manchurian Problems but no member of the Kwang Army including myself had ever conspired with them to cause the incident.

(4) On the Out-break of the "Sept. 18th Incident" and the resolution and measures taken by the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

On September 13, 1931, General HONJO ended his occasional inspection in connection with his first round of inspection at Liaoyang and was delivering an address to the 2nd Division, when there came a telegram addressed to Commander HONJO from the chief of staff, MIYAKE at Port Arthur, requesting him to ask the Staff-officer ITAGAKI or ISHIHARA (I) to stay in Mukden, as Major-general TATEKAWA was to arrive there from Tokyo. Then Commander HONJO ordered ITAGAKI to go to Mukden, and returned to Port Arthur that night, accompanied by the other members of the staff including myself. <sup>At</sup> that very mid-night, I was called up by Staff-officer NAKANO, who requested me to go at once to the official residence of the chief of staff. I hurried up to the place, not far from the headquarters, where I found all the members of the staff, including Lieutenant colonel TAKESHITA, in Japanese clothes, called together by Staff-officer Captain MATSUKURA. Then I was shown the first military top secret telegram stating that the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrison at Mukden was moving to the field upon receiving a report that after 10.00 p. Sep. 18 the outrageous Chinese troops destroyed the S.M.R. Railway at a point on the west side of Fei-tayin in Mukden, and attacked our guards with a resultant clash.



Then chief of staff, MIYAKE, called up the Commander at his official residence, asking him to come to the headquarters, where we ourselves went to work out remedial measures. At about 9:28 a.m., we received the second telegram from the Mukden Special Service Organ, stating that the enemy in Fei-tayin with three or four company strength exploded the S.M.R. Railway, that our Hushint<sup>g</sup> Company was fighting with some 5 or 6 hundred enemies after 11 p.m.; that a portion of Fei-tayin was occupied by us; that the enemy was increasing machine and infantry-guns; that the company was in great difficulty and disadvantage, and that Lieutenant NODA was seriously wounded. Then appeared the Commander of the Army, after a careful study the whole staff arrived at the following conclusion:

"The expected worst has unfortunately come owing to outrageous acts on the part of China; the limit of patience is reached. There is no knowing how the situation may aggravate even during this night unless we take a resolute measure to chastise the enemy. There is no time to lose. We must resolutely mobilize the whole strength of our military might to seal the fate of the enemy within the shortest possible time."

When I expressed my opinion as the operational officer to General HONJO to that effect, he meditated a few minutes with his eyes closed, and then, judging from the general situation, he made a final decision, saying resolutely, "Yes, let it be done on my own responsibility." We were all silent with deep emotion, and felt a great responsibility in the face of such a solemn, weighty resolution. Moreover, in spite of our usual operational plans, Commander HONJO ordered our forces not to concentrate in Mukden but to remain in Chang-chun in preparation against the enemies from Kuan-chengtzu and Nanling, or from Kirin. In view of the war situation in the

neighbourhood of Mukden, he adopted the course of gradually increasing our strength in order to make an attack instead of concentrating the main forces in Mukden. According to this decision and the general principle concerning the disposition of our units as indicated by the Commander, the usual operational plans were altered, and the orders were issued by telephone between 1:30 and 2:30 a.m. on September 19, to the following effect: the Commander of the Second Division in Liacyang should make an attack upon Mukden and its neighbourhood; the commander of the Independent Garrison in Kungchuling should concentrate its 1st and 5th battalions near Mukden; the commander of the 3rd battalion of the Independent Garrison in Tashichiao should get rid of the enemy in Yinkon; the commander of the 4th battalion of the Independent Garrison in Lianshankwan should sweep the enemies in Fenhuangcheng and Antung; the commander of the 6th battalion of the Independent Garrison in Anshan should go to Mukden with two companies and await orders from the commander of the 2nd Division; the commander of the 3rd infantry brigade in Changchun should guard Changchun with the 4th infantry and the 2nd cavalry regiments. In addition to the above the 30th infantry regiment and the heavy-gun battalion in port Arthur were ordered to move.

Commander-in-Chief HONJO, accompanied by the greater part of his staff officers including myself, left Port Arthur for Mukden shortly after 3 a.m. on the 19th, leaving MIYAKE, Chief of the Staff, one staff-officer, and the chiefs of each department temporarily in Port Arthur. On his way, he listened to the cries of officials and people on the railway-line demanding a punitive measure against the Chinese troops, and received reports on the changes of situation of battle. Upon his arrival at Mukden Station about noon

Def. Doc. # 886

on the 19th, he set up the commanding station immediately at the railway station for this occasion. In the meanwhile he sent reports to the central military authorities, and requested the Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army to send reinforcements (one mixed brigade) in accordance with the pre-arranged plan of operations. Also he requested a part of the 2nd overseas Fleet to be ordered out to Yingkou.

Previously on September 18, General HONJO had learned at Liouyang that General TAKEKAWA was coming for intercommunication by way of Mukden, and dispatched Colonel ITAGAKI to Mukden in the same afternoon, after the conclusion of inspection, in order to come in touch with him and also contact the Mukden Military Special Service Organ and the Consulate-General concerning the NAKAMURA case. Colonel ITAGAKI saw Major-general TAKEKAWA who arrived late at night on the same day, but left him without obtaining the details of the message under agreement that they were to meet again the next day. As the incident took place at that very mid-night, he gave certain directions as occasion required, concerning the war situation in Mukden. The senior staff-officer, Colonel ITAGAKI was well acquainted with Commander HONJO's intentions, and it was all the more true at that time, because the inspection of operational preparations just before the Incident disclosed Commander HONJO's idea rather clearly to him. So, every step he took in coping with the incident was in conformity with the Commander's intention, and as such was approved by the Commander as having contributed to the execution of the operation at about 6 p.m. on September 19, we received a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff to the following effect:

"(1) I believe that the decision and steps taken by the Commander of the Kwantung Army since the night of September 18 were quite opportune,

enhancing the prestige of the Japanese Army.

(2) In view of the attitude on the part of China since the outbreak of the Incident, the cabinet has decided that it should deal with the affairs without going too far beyond necessity. The actions of the forces in the field shall conform to this principle.

(3) On the relation between the measures to be adopted by the central authorities according to the principle of non-aggrandizement and the military movement of the Kwantung Army.

The Japanese government decided upon the principle of non-aggrandizement on September 19, immediately after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, and at about 6 p.m. on the same day, a telegram addressed to the Commander of the Army was received from the Minister of War, on the heels of the one already mentioned from the Chief of the General Staff, saying that, as regards the conflict between Japanese and Chinese forces, the Cabinet had decided upon the principle of making every effort to prevent the aggrandizement of the Incident, though it is of the opinion that as it had been caused by the destruction of the S.M.R. Railway by the Chinese, the Chinese were to be blamed, and accordingly, it requested us to act upon this principle in the future. The Kwantung Army understood thoroughly the intention and policy of the government and also of the central military authorities e.i. the policy of non-aggrandizement through the aforementioned telegrams from the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff. But the objective actuality of an armed clash in the field was contradictory to the policy of non-aggrandizement in the result and severe reprimandings were very often received from the central authorities. It is, firstly, because the central authorities failed to understand the

real situation in the field. Of course we, the Kwantung Army, strove to act in conformity with the central policy, but it was absolutely necessary to forestall the Chinese by showing activity, and dealing with them immediately, as we were inferior in numbers and scattered all over South Manchuria. However, the central authorities failed to understand this psychology of the forces in the field and the movements of the Chinese, and intended to treat the matter with a optimistic observation or consideration of a purely diplomatic convenience. Secondly, it is because the Nanking Government with whom our central authorities entered into negotiation had no control over the North-eastern Army, and failed to live up to its promise. Even Chang Hsui-liang could not control the confused movements of his regional forces. The negotiations at Tokyo, Nanking and Peiping failed to be in time, so that there was no other way left than that of settling the situation regionally in the field.

Toward the end of September, the Kwantung Army concentrated its forces along the S.M.R. Railway to watch the situation. The enemies in Chinchou and Lungkian were showing signs of counter-attacks accumulating a superior strength. When the Nonkian-chao Bridge was destroyed toward the end of October in 1931, we negotiated with the Executive Council of the Chinese Eastern Railway through our consul-general in Harbin, and also with Ma Chanshan through our consul in Chinchihærh, and, with their understanding, began the repair of the damaged bridge, when the Chinese army stationed there started firing unreasonably at our repair unit. Our covering force was thus obliged to return the fire, and was placed in a difficult position. Ma Chanshan failed to make a concession inspite of sequence of negotiations, until our central authorities, recognizing the situation, took actions to



meet the Ma Chanshan Forces.

While the Kwantung Army was obliged to send its main forces to Chichi-haerh, leaving only 2 companies in Mukden, the Chinese concentrated a great force in Chinchou. The anti-Japanese propaganda from China Proper was constantly made and thus the advance of this reinforced enemy forces was a great menace to the South Manchurian Area as well as an irritant to the nerves of the Kwantung Army. Then we came to entertain an opinion that we must weep out the source of disturbance in Chinchou. In the second Tientsin Incident toward the end of November, our Tientsin Army requested the help of the Kwangtung Army but, in view of the basic policy not to stimulate the Soviet Union after the collapse of Ma Chanshan's main forces, we were ready to send forces to Chinchou by any means, even though we might be obliged to call back forces from the North. However, the attempt was checked by the central supreme command. It seemed that, through the medium of the Chinese diplomatic authorities, a proposal was made to our diplomatic circles, to establish a neutral area in the neighbourhood of Chinchou. But the Chinese attitude was such that if we withdrew our forces, China would immediately withdraw this proposal too. At any rate, it was necessary for our small force situated in an extremely disadvantageous position from a military standpoint, to take the initiative in increasing the war-like intention of the enemy at the start.

General HCNJO, Commander of the Kwantung Army, though a man of mild character, used to take a wide view of things to listen to the positive opinions of junior staff-officers, to take the whole responsibility, for his duties abroad, and to issue orders or point out the general principles. It is true that the Kwantung Army often did not hesitate to make positive



suggestions to the central authorities and secretaries had heated arguments with them, but I affirm that it has never acted against an Imperial order or instruction so long as the supreme command was involved.

The actions, if any, taken by the Commander of the Kwantung Army without asking instructions from the central authorities, were only the following two :

The one was the movement of the main forces of the Kwantung Army at the sudden outbreak of the Mukden Incident. But, in view of the prevailing military situation, it can be learned that General HONJO exercised his authority according to Article 3 of the regulations of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and his usual operational preparations in peace time.

The other was the bombing of Chinchou on October 8. The fact was that six of scout-airplanes of 88-type and five seized FOTĒKI's (T.N. phonetic) were flying to reconnoitre the conditions of the North-eastern Army in Chinchou area, when they were fired at, and in self-defence, dropped 75 bombs on the Communications University (Military Government Office), barracks of the 28th Division and Chang Tsue-hsiang's private residence and so on. These bombs were in the size of 7 c.m. mountain-gun balls, and were dropped by hands having no perfect dropping-apparatus so they might have gone wild. Compared with the bombing of London by the German air forces in the former European War, or the bombing of the Japanese towns by the American B-29s etc. in the present war, or the destruction of the cities of HIROSHIMA or NAGASAKI by the Atomic Bombs, I am sure that the damage caused by our bombing was almost insignificant

in all other matters the Kwantung Army went through thorough exchange of views with the central authorities, and never started its operations without receiving the latter's instructions. As to the operations in the North Manchuria, the general relations with the Soviet Union were taken into consideration, and our forces were subjected to restriction in their movements, inspite of the operational disadvantage and inconvenience, lest the Soviet Union should suspect aggressive intention on our part or her rights and interests in North Manchuria should be violated.

(4) "On the settlement of the Manchurian Problem and the military point of view". The true situation then existing between Japan and China can be characterized as the conflict of opposing demands, the recovery of national prestige from the Chinese side and the preservation of the rights and interests from the Japanese side. It seemed exceedingly difficult to settle the issue unless one party make a concession or a compromise be reached between the two parties, consequently we could hardly expect to maintain our rights and interests merely through diplomatic negotiations. In order to enable our people to engage in peaceful economic activities in Manchuria, there seemed to be no other way of solution than to give up all our special rights and interests, political, economic and military unless China agreed to compromise. However, judging from the then Foreign Minister SHIDERA's statement made in the Diet in October, 1931, or Prime Minister MATSUOKA's made in a provincial meeting in April, our government could not carry out such a drastic policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia, nor did the public opinion permit such a course. As a matter of fact, should the Japanese forces have been entirely withdrawn from Manchuria, not only our rights and interests would have been

lost imperilling even the lives of our residents but also the Soviet Union which was recovering her influence in the Far East, as was seen in the then "Russo-Chinese dispute," would have encroached upon Manchuria. Then, in view of the traditional policy of the Soviet Unions, Manchuria would have become a basis of Communistic propaganda, and the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria would have been impossible, imperilling not only our national defence but jeopardizing China's national defence. It was quite clear judging from the conditions after the Sino-Japanese War and the causes of the Russo-Japanese War. The reason why Britain and U.S. supported us in our war with Russia was to check the Russian encroachment upon the Far East. Though the Kwantung Army was not concerned in making demand or comment on our diplomatic policy, it was seriously concerned with the establishment of peace and the defence of Manchuria in order to save the situation caused by the collapse of the North-eastern Army after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. In the face of such a new situation, the Kwantung Army and its commander could not but consider the advisability of establishing a defensive disposition against the Soviet Union from a military standpoint.

Of course it meant only the establishment of our defensive position toward Russian and it was not our intention to attack the Soviet Union with Manchuria as its basis of operations. In other words, we tried to make the most of this favorable disposition, from a strategic point of view, in perfect concert with China to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding south, and to give a silent assistance to our delegate in negotiation. The founding of Manchukuo was brought about as a result of the new political revolution in the North-eastern China, following the collapse

of the North-eastern military clique, quite apart from the said military view-point. It was anything but the means or object of our military movements though our military action may have given an opportunity for it. It is a pity that Manchuria was separated from China as a means of settling the Incident, but we thought that we must understand the tendencies, activities, and co-operations of the various races in Manchuria before we could cut the root of disturbances over many years in order to establish equilibrium in the East. That is to say, we should seek the co-prosperity of the races through their cooperation, which, from a military point of view, would terminate war, and consequently achieve Sino-Japanese co-operation. So the Kwantung Army was devoted to the speedy establishment of peace and order, from this military point of view, expecting the situation to be improved by officials and people themselves of the region and did not enforce military administration in the occupied areas.

The army was not concerned much in the politics and economy of the new state. But, we were confident that, in order to exterminate disturbances through racial unity in Manchuria and to realize co-existence and co-prosperity of Japan and China, Japan herself should set an example, by abandoning her claims to the rights and interests and contributing to the stabilization of Manchuria in a new moral basis. With this confidence we instructed officers and men to watch over their own conducts with great self-restraint.

As the new state was successfully founded, there appeared afterward some people, military and civilian, who claimed for themselves the credit of its foundation, saying that they planned it themselves or with the Kwantung Army, etc. But the foundation of Manchukuo was nothing more than

Def. Doc. # 886

a historical product of Manchuria, and I believe that the idea of racial cooperation will live for ever.

On this 16 day of January, 1947.

At Yamagata Prefecture

DEPONENT ISHIHARA Kanji (seal)

I, YAMADA Hanzo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: (signed) YAMADA Hanzo (seal)

Def. Doc. # 886

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole  
truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ISHIHARA Kanji (seal)



Not used

386

東京國際商事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

河

荒木 貞夫 其他

宣誓供述者

供述者

石原 莞爾

自分儘我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上  
次ノ如ク供述致シマス

私ハ一九二九年（昭和四年）、三月カラ一九三二年（昭和七年）、八月迄關東軍參謀トシテ主トシテ作戰ニ關スル業務ニ服シ其ノ間一九三一年（昭和六年）九月奉天事件ヲ契機トスル滿洲事變ニ遭遇シマシタノデ當時ノ關東軍ノ滿洲事變關係ノ行動就中主トシテ其ノ軍事行動ヲ中心トシテ叙述致シマス

第一、滿洲事變前ニ於ケル一般情勢就中日本ノ軍事的地位ニ就テ

日露戰爭後日本ガ滿洲ニ於ケル駐兵權ヲ獲得シマシタ頃ノ東北四省ニ於ケル支那軍ノ軍事力ハ極メテ微弱デアリマシテ我軍ハ長延ナル南滿洲鐵道線沿ノ保護モ修約上ノ權利ニ基ク少數ノ兵力ヲ以テ安全ナラシメ得タルノ外、居留民ノ保護ニモ何等不安ヲ感ズルコトガアリマシタ然ルニ清朝崩壞後張作霖ガ逐次勢力ヲ張り關内ニ其ノ野望ヲ大ナラシムルニ至リ漸次其ノ兵力ヲ増強シマスト共ニ中國全般ニ澎湃タル國權回復運動ニモ影響ヲラレ滿洲ニ於ケル彼ノ政策ガ日蘇兩勢力ノ驅逐ヲ試ムルニ至リ其ノ軍隊ノ行動ハ滿洲ニ於テ相當考慮ヲ要スル所トナッタノデアリマス、張作霖ノ暴死後張學良ガ其ノ後ヲ襲ヒ、東北ノ易轡ヲ斷行シマスルヤ當部勢力ノ侵入ヲ招來シ滿洲ニ於ケル排日運動ハ當部官憲使喚ノ下ニ組織化セラレテ極メテ活潑熾烈トナリ在

東北支那軍隊ニモ作シテ其ノ軍隊ノ行動ハ極メテ重視セラレ得ナイ状態ニナツカ次第デアリマス。

張學良ノ對南京忠厚表明ト共ニ學良ハ國民黨軍ノ副司令ニ任セラレマシタ。彼ハ其ノ軍隊ノ改編ヲ企圖シ二十二萬ニ上ル常備兵力ノ維持、奉天兵工廠ノ規模拡大、戰車、飛行機等ノ近代兵器ノ裝備、訓練機關ノ強化等量質共ニ充實ヲ圖リ當時在滿ノ我軍ニ比シテ兵力裝備ニ於テ優越デアルノミナラス其ノ軍隊配置ハ逐次ニ滿鐵沿線我軍駐屯諸地域ノ包圍態勢ニ變更セラレ其ノ將兵ノ抗日意識ノ昂揚誠ニ昂然クルモノガアリマシタ、斯クノ如キ挑戰的態度ニ對シ長延且分散的ニ配置セラレマシタ。關東軍トシテハ軍事のニ極メテ危險ナル状態ニ陥リマシタ、關東軍將兵ハ東北軍意指導ノ組織的排日侮日行爲ガ我鐵道守備勤務並行軍演習ニ加ヘラレ各種ノ妨害行爲、事故ノ頻發ニ直面シ將又在滿邦人ノ苦境呻吟ヲ目ノ方リ見ルニツケ實ニ憤激ノ極ニ達シタ。次第デアリマス、而シテ東北ニ於ケル支那ノ一般的軍事情勢ノ變化ニ伴フ緊迫ナル事態ニ對處シ現地關東軍トシマシテハ兵力增強部隊配置變更等ノ意見具申ヲ行ヒマシタガ陸軍中央部ノ容認スルトコロトナラズ、微弱ナル日本軍ハ平時態

勢ノ優優勢ニシテ抗日意識ニ燃ユル支那大軍ノ面前ニ曝サレ、一方何等見ルベキ外交的處理モ講ゼラレズ、唯口先ノミノ形勢緩和ノ策ガ叫バレルノミデ日支兩軍ノ關係ハ一觸即發恰モ噴火山上ニ在ル儘ニ放置セラレマシタ

### 第三、事變當時關東軍ノ作戰準備ノ概要ニ就テ

平時ヨリ關東軍ハ南滿鐵道ノ守備並關東州ノ防衛ニ任スルノ外有時ニ於テソ聯軍ノ滿洲侵入ニ伴ヒ惹起スルコトアルヘキ日蘇開戰ニ際シ日本軍主力ノ滿洲ニ於ケル集中掩護ニ任ズル作戰任務ヲ附與セラレ所要ノ準備ヲシテ居リマシタ、勿論コノ對蘇作戰準備ハ北滿方面ニ進出シタ蘇聯軍ガ更ニ南滿地區ニ攻撃シ來ル際漸ク南滿北側地帯ヲ襲撃スル程度ノ防衛的ナモノデアリマス從テ支那軍ニ對シテハ本來我作戰準備ノ對象トシテハ居ラナカッタノデアリマスガ前ニ申シマシタ様ニ東北ノ情勢ガ惡化シ殊ニ其ノ軍隊ガ抗日意識ニ燃エテ逐次日支兩軍ノ間ニ衝突ノ危險ヲ包藏スルニ至ツテ參リマシタノデ當時數年前ヨリ陸軍中央統帥部ヨリノ命令指示ニ基キ武力ヲ以テ其ノ任務ヲ達成スヘク萬一ニ處スル應變ノ作戰ヲ準備セラレタ次第デアリマス、即チ裝備編成劣弱ナ約一萬餘ノ關東軍ハ長春以南一〇〇〇軒ニ近キ南滿鐵道ニ平時態勢ノ

分配置ヲシレニ○敵軍ヲ算スル支那軍ノ包圍下ニ在リ殊ニ奉天、長春、  
 昌圖、鳳凰城等ニハ數千乃至數萬ノ大兵ガ駐屯シ奉天王以哲旅ノ各兵室ニハ  
 對日強行決意ヲ示タル旅長ノ訓示ガ印刷ヲラレテ敵意ヲ昂進サレテイルト云  
 フ機ナ狀態ニ於テ軍ハ莫一、日支衝突地點ノ何レタルトヲ問ハズ機先ヲ制シ  
 殆ト關東軍ノ全力ヲ舉ケテ奉天附近ニ集中シ一舉ニ在奉天軍中樞並東北軍ノ  
 精銳ニ一掃ヲ加ヘ彼ノ死命ヲ制シ至短期間ニ解決スルノ作戰方針ヲ確立シ之  
 ニ基ク教育、訓練、輸送等諸般ノ準備ヲ整ヘタ次第デアリマス

過少ノ兵力ヲ以テ敵ニ對シ此困難ナル任務ヲ達成スル爲ニハ極メテ周到ナ  
 ル計畫、準備、軍ノ團結鞏化並訓練ノ精到トヲ必要トシマレタ特ニ各部隊ニ  
 ハ軍紀ヲ至嚴ナラシメ鑽石ノ團結ヲ保持シテ教育訓練ヲ重點主義ニ徹シ實戰  
 ニ則スル如ク要求ヲラレタ次第デアリマス、本庄軍司令官ガ昭和六年八月菱  
 刈大將ニ代ツテ著任ヲラル、ヤ當時殊ニ中村大尉事件、萬寶山事件等ノ累發  
 各地守備勤務ニ關スル衝突事件ノ頻發等ニ鑑ミ事態ノ急迫ヲ察知トラレ一方  
 ニ於テハ將兵ヲ嚴ニ戒メテ隱忍自重輕舉妄動ヲ禁ズルト共ニ他方ニ於テハ服  
 務ニ當リ一貫衝突シタトキハ特ニ小部隊ハ積極果敢短切ナル行動ヲ以テ

其ノ任務ノ解決ニ邁進シ彼ヲシテ輕兵ト侮リ徒ラニ事態ヲ擴大セシメザルコ  
トヲ訓示セラレ又着任後ノ初度巡視ニ際シテハ隨時檢閲ヲ併行ヒ特ニ各隊  
ノ作戰準備ノ完遂ヲ點檢セラレマシタ又裝備ニ於テ其ノ兵數ニ於テ劣弱ニシ  
テ然モ陸軍中央當局ヨリ何等ノ増強ヲモ期待出來ヌ狀態ニ鑑ミ關東軍トシテ  
ハ滿洲ニ所在スル利用可能ノ範圍ニ於ケル作戰資材ノ活用ニヨリ戰力ノ増強  
ニ努メマシタ例ハ或ハ奉天獨立守備第二大隊ノ兵舍ニ重砲二門ヲ備ヘ付ケ  
ルトカ或ハ歩兵部隊ノ一部ニ裝甲自動車若干ヲ裝備スルトカ爆藥裝備其ノ他  
城壁攻撃資材ヲ用意スル等戰鬪威力ノ缺陷ヲ補フ努力ヲシタ次第デアリマス  
併シ乍ラ廣域又ハ長期ノ作戰遂行ノ能力ハ關東軍トシテハ何等之ヲ有シナカ  
ツタ次第デアリマス、軍隊輸送ノ如キモ遼陽部隊ノ奉天ニ向フ列車輸送ハ  
糧食運後約一時間ニシテ開始ラル、ノ自信ヲ持ツテ居リマシタガ事實當時  
ハ遺憾乍ラ約四時間ヲ要シマシタ又敵裝備ノ優良就中迫撃砲ノ強大、戰車、  
飛行機等ノ保持ニ鑑ミ我方トシテハ得意ノ夜戰ノ訓練ヲ熾烈ナラシメ、又城  
壁攻撃ノ演習ヲ重ヌル等一以テ百ニ當ルノ概ヲ以テ應變ニ違算ナキヲ期シタ  
次第デアリマス



第三、關東軍作戰準備ト部外者トノ關係ニ就テ

滿洲事變當時ニ於ケル關東軍司令官ハ前申シタ如ク薙刈大將ノ後ヲ受ケテ昭和六年八月著任シタ本庄終中將デアツテ參謀長ハ三宅光治少將高級參謀ハ張作霖爆死後更迭シシノラレタル河本大佐ノ後任トシテ板垣征四郎大佐、作戰主任ハ自分デ其ノ他少佐大尉等若干ノ幕僚ガ居リ又奉天特務機關長ハ昭和六年八月鈴木義通少將ニ代ツタ土肥原賢二大佐デアリマス、張學良ノ軍事顧問ハ柴山金四郎少佐デ其ノ他若干ノ軍事教官ガ東北陸軍ニ招聘セラレテ居リマシタ、又第二師團長ハ多門二郎中將、獨立守備隊司令官ハ森連中將デアリマス、之等ノ將校ハ所謂三月事件トハ何等ノ關係ナク櫻會等ノ「ノンバー」デモナク又自分ハ滿洲事變迄橋本欣五郎大佐並大川周明博士トハ別ニ懇談シタコトハ一同モアリマシタ、殊ニ張作霖爆死事件後日本内地ニ於テハ關東軍ニ對スル非難モ相當アツタノデ前軍司令官薙刈大將、前々司令官畑英太郎大將等總テ關東軍首腦部ハ特ニ在滿軍隊ノ行動ニ嚴戒ヲ發シテ自重ヲ要望シ居中板垣征四郎大佐ハ高級參謀トシテ軍司令部ノ幕僚勸誘ヲ完全ニ統制シテ居リ不軌ヲ圖ルガ如キ徒輩ノナイコトハ確信ヲ有シテ居リマシタ併シ支那側ノ排日狀態就中其ノ軍隊ノ對自抗戰意氣ノ昂揚並其ノ不逞ナル行動ヲ見且又日

支各種交渉が我が協調外交ニモ拘ラズ悉ク成功トズ、日支ノ國論尖鋭化シツ  
 ヲアル状態ヲ見彼此武力衝突ハ最早必至ノ情勢ニアリトノ感想ハ軍司令官以  
 下全幕僚各部隊長始メ全將兵ノ悉クガ考ヘテ居ツタ所デアリマス從テ關東軍  
 トシテハ萬一衝突ニ際シテノ單獨目ノ作戰準備又其ノ作戰ニ伴フ治安維持ノ  
 方策等ニ關シテハ實ニ眞劍ナル研究ヲ續キ我々旅順ニ於ケル軍司令部ノ幕僚  
 ハ日曜日より、國々私事ノ爲ニ休ムガ豫謀將校ハ一人モナカツタ衣類デアリ  
 マス、又各部隊ハ命令ノ努力ヲシテ不眠不休訓練ノ向上ト守備勤務ノ充進ニ  
 精進シテ大動員ノ準備ヲ爲ス  
 滿洲事變發見時以來、事件トシテ知ラレル事件ニ隨シテモ東京ノ方デハ關東軍  
 ヲ獨立スルハ、我々關東軍ト相呼應シテ何カ事ヲ起スト云フ様ナ機密ヲ持ツ  
 タ向モアツテ可成リ激越ナル電報ガ來タリ又豫言ノ爲白川大將等ガ來朝トラ  
 レタコトモアリマス、又我々關東軍トシテハ誠ニ冷靜デ只管任務達成ニ努メテ居  
 リ、寧コ中央ノ我々派ハニ噴飯笑止ヲ禁ジ得ナカツタ次第デアリマス又當時滿  
 鐵其他民間ニハ色ト滿洲問題ニ關スル意見ヲ有ツテ居ツタモノガアツタ様  
 デアリマスガ自分ヲ始メ關東軍將兵ガ之等ノモノト事變ヲ引起スガ如キ計畫

ヲ謀議シタコトハ毫末モアリマケンデシタ

第四九、一八事件突發ト關東軍司令官ノ決心部署ニ就テ

昭和六年（一九三一年）九月十八日日本庄將軍ハ初度巡視ヲ發シタル隨時檢  
 閱ノ最後ヲ遼陽デ終ツテ第二師團ニ訓示ヲ與ヘマシタ、スルト旅順ニ居タ三  
 宅參謀長カラ本庄司令官宛ニ「東京カラ建川少將カ奉天ニ來ルトノコト故板  
 垣參謀カ石原參謀ハ私ノコト」ヲ奉天ニ殘ス様ニ「トノ電報ガ來マシタ、其  
 處デ本庄司令官ハ板垣參謀ヲ奉天ニ行ク様ニ命シ其ノ夜私共ノ他ノ幕僚ノ大  
 部ヲ從ヘテ旅順ニ歸リマシタ、此夜半自分ハ中野參謀カラ大至急參謀長ノ官  
 舎ニ來テクレトノコトデ軍司令部カラ程遠カラヌ參謀長官舎ニ距ツマシ  
 タ其處ニハ既に軍幕僚片倉大尉ノ手配デ竹下中佐以下各幕僚ガ和服ノ儀參集  
 シテ居リマシタ其ノ際「十八日夜一〇時過奉天北大營西側ニ於テ暴戾ナル支  
 那軍隊ハ滿鐵線ヲ破壞守備兵ヲ襲ヒ我ガ守備隊ト衝突セリトノ報告ニ接シ奉  
 天獨立守備步兵第二大隊ハ現地ニ向ツテ出發中ナリ」トノ第一報トシテノ軍  
 機電報ヲ承知シ三宅參謀長ヨリ軍司令官官邸ニ電話ヲ以テ連絡シテ軍司令  
 官ノ司令部ニ出頭ヲ求ムルト共ニ自分達ハ打揃ツテ其ノ備軍司令部ニ參リマ

シテ善後策ニ關シ研究シマシタ

零時二八分頃奉天特務機關ヨリ「北大營ノ敵ハ滿鐵線ヲ爆破其ノ兵力三、四中隊ニシテ虎石臺中隊ハ十一時過ギ五、六百ノ敵ト交戦中北大營ノ一角占領敵ハ機關銃歩兵砲ヲ増加シツ、アリ、中隊ハ目下苦戦中野田中尉ハ重傷ヲリートノ第二報ヲ接受シマシタ、其處ニ軍司令官ガ登臨セラレマシタ。扨テ軍參謀長以下ノ研究デハ「支那軍ノ暴舉ニ基キ事態ガ此處ニ到ツタ以上ハ不幸ニシテ予期セル最惡ノ事態ガ到來シタ最早隱忍自重モ極言ニ達シタ此際斷乎トシテ機先ヲ制シテ敵ヲ屠戮シナクレバ今夜如何ニ惡化スルカモ分ラナイ現下彼我逼迫シタ狀態ハ最早一刻ヲ猶豫スベカラズ斷乎トシテ軍全力ノ行動ヲ起シ短切ニ敵中樞ノ死命ヲ制スベキデアルトノ結論ニ達シマシタノデ自分ハ作戰主任トシテ本庄將軍ニ意見ヲ開陳シマシタ、本庄司令官ハ瞋目セラレテ沈思默想約五分間開眼セラレマスルト一般ノ形勢ヲ判斷セラレ「デシイ本職ノ責任ニ於テヤロウト確乎タル決意ヲ以テ斷案ヲ下サレタ、幕僚一同肅然感慨ニ打タレタ次第デアリマス、而シテ此莊重干鈞ノ重ミアル決斷ノ下自分等ハ實ニ油然トシテ責任ノ重大ヲ感セラレマ

シタ、更ニ本庄將軍ハ平素ノ作戰計畫ニ拘ラズ在長春部隊ハ奉天集中ヲ止  
 メテ其ノ舊長春方面ニ位置シテ萬一ヲ慮リ寬城子、南嶺ノ敵ニ  
 對處シ若クハ吉林方面ヨリスル敵ノ反抗ニ對シメラレマシタ、又奉天附  
 近ノ戰況ニ鑑ミ軍主力ヲ先ツ奉天附近ニ集中スル案ヲ執ラス、兵力ノ逐次  
 加入ニヨリ攻勢ヲ斷行スルコトニ部署ヲラレマシタ。此ノ軍司令官ノ決斷  
 及部署ノ大體指示ニ基キ平素ノ作戰計畫ニ變更ヲ加ヘヤ九日午前一時半乃  
 至二時ノ間ニ左記諸命令ヲ發ケラレマシタ即チ在遼陽第二師團長ニハ奉天  
 附近進攻ヲ在公土里獨立守備隊司令官ニハ獨立守備第一第六大隊ヲ以テ  
 奉天附近ニ集中ヲ大石橋獨立守備第三大隊長ニハ營口ノ敵ノ驅逐ヲ連山關  
 獨立守備第四大隊長ニハ鳳凰城、安東附近ノ敵ノ掃蕩ヲ、鞍山獨立守備第  
 六大隊長ニハ約二中隊ヲ以テ奉天ニ至リ第二師團長ノ區處下ニ入ルヘキコ  
 トヲ又在長春步兵第三旅團長ニハ步兵第四聯隊及騎兵第二聯隊ヲ以テ長春  
 ノ警備ヲ夫々電報テ命ケラレマシタ尙在旅順步兵第三十聯隊及旅順重砲兵  
 大隊ニハ出動命令ヲ下達シマシタ

本庄軍司令官ハ三宅參謀長及參謀一各部長全部ヲ一時旅順ニ殘置シ自分以

下草條ノ大部ヲ隨ヘ十九日午前三時過旅順ヲ發シ奉天ニ向ツテ進發セラレ  
マシタ途申治線官民ノ支那軍膚斃ノ絶叫スル要望ヲ浴ヒツツ又刻々推移ス  
ル戦局ノ報告ヲ接受シツツ十九日正午頃奉天停車場ニ到着ヲシテ不取敢臨  
時ニ戰團司令所ヲ奉天停車場ニ開設シマシタ尙此間軍司令官ハ陸軍中央部  
ニ報告シマスト共ニ朝鮮軍司令官ニ稱テノ作戰協定ニ基キ兵力ハ混成一旅  
團ノ増援ヲ要求シマシタ、又第二遣外艦隊ノ艦船一部ノ營口出動ヲ要請  
シマシタ

之ヨリ前九月十八日本庄將軍ハ遼陽ニ於テ建川將軍ガ連絡ノ爲ニ奉天經由  
テ來ルト云フコトヲ承知セラレ之ト連絡ノ爲ニ中村事件ニ關スル奉天陸  
軍時務機關及總領事館側トノ連絡ヲ兼ねテ檢閱終了後同日午後板垣大佐ヲ  
遼陽カラ奉天ニ派遣シマシタ、板垣大佐ハ偶々同夕晚々來奉シ建川少將  
ト會見シタ後詳シイ連絡用務モ聞カズニ更ニ會見ヲ翌日ニ約シテ別レマシ  
タガ其ノ夜半事件ニ遭遇シテ茲デ奉天現地ニ於ケル戦局ニ關シ所要ノ指導  
ヲシマシタ、板垣大佐ハ高級參謀トシテ既ニ平素ヨリ本庄軍司令官ノ意圖  
ヲ承知シテ居リマシタガ殊ニ直前ニ於テ作戰準備ニ關スル檢閱等デ一層



一ニ處ル軍司令官ノ企圖ガ闡明セラレテ居ツタ矢先デアリマスノデ此突  
發タル事件ニ際シ執ツタ機宜ノ行動ハ悉ク軍司令官ノ意圖ニ合シ之ヲ承認  
セラレタ次第デアリマス、軍作戦遂行上ニモ重大ナ貢獻ヲシタノデアリマ  
ス、尙九月十九日ノ午後六時頃參謀長カラハ次ノ趣旨ノ電報ヲ受領シマシ  
タ

(一) 九月十八日夜以後ニ於ケル關東軍司令官ノ決心及處置ハ機宜ニ適シタ  
ルモノニシテ日本軍隊ノ威重ヲ加ヘタルモノト信シアリ

(二) 事件發生以來支那側ノ態度ニ鑑ミ事件ノ處理ニ關シテハ必要度ヲ超ニ  
ザルコトニ關議ノ決定モアリ、從ツテ今後軍ノ行動ハ此趣旨ニ依リ善  
處セララルベシ

第三、事件不擴大方針ニ基ク中央部ノ處理方策ト關東軍ノ軍事行動トノ

#### 關係ニ就テ

奉天事變突發ニ伴フテ日本政府ハ九月十九日事態不擴大ノ方針ヲ決定シ  
テ其ノ日午後六時頃前述參謀總長ノ電報ト相前後シテ陸軍大臣カラ軍司令  
官宛「今回ノ日支衝突事件ニ關シテ帝國政府ハ支那兵ガ鐵道線路ヲ破壞ス

ルニ基因スルモノニシテ非ハ固ヨリ彼ニ存スルモ事態ヲ擴大セザル様ニ極力努ムルコトニ方針ヲ確定セリ右御含ミノ上行動アリタシトフ趣旨ノ電報ヲ接受シマシタ、關東軍トシテハ此ノ大臣ノ電報竝ニ前述ノ總長電報ニ依ツテ政府竝ニ中央統帥部ノ意圖方針ハヨク承知ヲ致シマシタ、即チ其ノ要望スル不擴大ノ方針ハヨク承知シテタル所デアリマシタガ現地ニ於ケル武力衝突發生トイフ客觀的事態ハ結果ニ於テ不擴大方針ト喰違ヒ屢々中央ヨリ御叱リヲ蒙リマシタ、其ノ主因ヲ考ヘマスト先ツ現地ニ於ケル事態ガ常ニ中央ニ對シテ精確ニ捕捉セラレナカッタコトデアリマス、我々關東軍トシマシテモ中央ノ方針ヲ体シテ行動シ其ノ努力ヲ續ケタノデアリマスガ何分兵力不足ノ齎ス各方面ノ障礙ハ關東軍トシテハ極メテ敏感ニ作用シマシテ齎動策應スル支那軍ニ對シ時刻モ與ヘズ機先之ヲ處理スルコトガ必要デアリマシタ、然ルニ中央ニ於テハ現地軍ノ此ノ戰場心理ノ理解、現地支那軍ノ意向ガ分ラズ希望の觀測若シクハ外交交渉ノ都合等カラノミ考慮シテ處理セラレマシタ

次ニ我が中央當局ノ外交交渉ハ相手方タル南京政府トシテハ東北ニ對シテ

大ナル統制力ガナク、口約ハ悉ク實行セラレマセン、又張學良モ混亂セル各地軍隊ノ行動ヲ抑制スルコトガ出來ナカツタノデアリマス、我中央若クハ南京、北京ニ於ケル交渉ハ時機ニ間ニ合ハズ從ツテ事態ヲ現地局地的ニ解決スル以外ニ方途ガナクナリマシタ

九月下旬關東軍ハ兵力ヲ滿鐵沿線ニ集結シ情勢ヲ靜觀シマシタガ錦州、龍江何レモ大兵ヲ擁シテ反抗ヲ舉ニ出デントスルノ氣配ガアリマシタ、昭和六年十月末龍江橋梁破壊セララルヤ我方ハ「ハルビン」總領事ヲ遣ジテ東支鐵道理事會ニ又在一「チチハル」領事ヲ遣ジテ馬占山ニ交渉シテ其ノ了解ノ下ニ龍江附近ノ橋梁ノ修理ヲ始メマシタ所其ノ修理班ニ對シテ現地支那軍ハ不法射撃ヲ開始シ我掩護部隊ハ已ムナク應戰シ苦戰ニ陥リマシタ、爾後屢次ノ交渉ニモ拘ラス遂ニ應ズ中央部又之ノ事態ヲ認メ之ヲ擊破スルノ方途ヲ執リ馬占山軍邀撃トナリマシタ、又關東軍主力ガ遂ニ「チチハル」方面ニ進出ヲ餘儀ナクセラルヤ、奉天附近ニハ僅カニ歩兵二中隊ヲ止メ得タニ過デマセン、我輕兵ヲ察知シ支那軍ハ錦州方面ニ大軍ヲ擁シ殊ニ當時支那本土方面カラハ盛シニ抗日宣傳ヲ行ヒ此ノ敵兵力ノ増加出動ハ南滿地區ノ重大ナル脅威デアリ關東軍トシテハ極メテ軍ノ神經ヲ刺戟シ錦

ルニ基因スルモノニシテ非ハ固ヨリ彼ニ存スルモ事態ヲ擴大セザル様ニ極力努ムルコトニ方針ヲ確定セリ右御含ミノ上行動アリタシトノ趣旨ノ電報ヲ接受シマシタ、關東軍トシテハ此ノ大臣ノ電報竝ニ前述ノ總長電報ニ依ツテ政府竝ニ中央統帥部ノ意圖方針ハヨク承知ヲ致シマシタ、即チ其ノ要旨スル不擴大ノ方針ハヨク承知シテタル所デアリマシタガ現地ニ於ケル武力衝突發生トイフ客觀的事態ハ結果ニ於テ不擴大方針ト喰違ヒ屢々中央ヨリ御叱リヲ蒙リマシタ、其ノ主因ヲ考ヘマスト先ツ現地ニ於ケル事態ガ常ニ中央ニ對シテ精確ニ捕捉セラレナカッタコトデアリマス、我々關東軍トシマシテモ中央ノ方針ヲ体シテ行動シ其ノ努力ヲ經ウタノデアリマ스가何分兵力不足ノ齎ス各方面ノ障ハ關東軍トシテハ極メテ敏感ニ作用シマシテ齎動策應スル支那軍ニ對シ寸刻モ與ヘズ機先之ヲ處理スルコトガ必要デアリマシタ、然ルニ中央ニ於テハ現地軍ノ此ノ戰場心理ノ理解、現地支那軍ノ動向ガ分ラズ希望の觀測若シクハ外交交渉ノ都合等カラノミ考慮シテ處理セラレマシタ

次ニ我が中央當局ノ外交交渉ハ相手方タル南京政府トシテハ東北ニ對シテ

大ナル統制力ガナク、口約ハ悉ク實行セラレマセン、又張學良モ混亂セル各地軍隊ノ行動ヲ抑制スルコト出テ來ナカツタノデアリマス、我中央若クハ南京、北京ニ於ケル交渉ハ時機ニ間ニ合ハズ從ツテ事態ヲ現地局地的ニ解決スル以外ニ方途ガナクナリマシタ

九月下旬關東軍ハ兵力ヲ滿鐵沿線ニ集結シ情勢ヲ靜觀シマシタガ錦州、龍江何レモ大兵ヲ擁シテ反抗ノ舉ニ出デントスルノ氣配ガアリマシタ、昭和六年十月末龍江橋梁破壊セララルヤ我方ハ「ハルビン」總領事ヲ通ジテ東支鐵道理事會ニ又在一「チヂハル」領事ヲ通ジテ馬占山ニ交渉シテ其ノ了解ノ下ニ龍江附近ノ橋梁ノ修理ヲ始メマシタ所其ノ修理班ニ對シテ現地支那軍ハ不法射撃ヲ開始シ我掩護部隊ハ已ムナク應戰シ苦戰ニ陥リマシタ、爾後屢次ノ交渉ニモ拘ラス遂ニ應ズ中央部又之ノ事態ヲ認メ之ヲ擊破スルノ方途ヲ執リ馬占山軍邀撃トナリマシタ、又關東軍主力ガ遂ニ「チヂハル」方面ニ進出ヲ餘儀ナクセラルヤ、奉天附近ニハ僅カニ步兵二中隊ヲ止メ得タニ過デマセン、我輕兵ヲ察知シ支那軍ハ錦州方面ニ大軍ヲ擁シ殊ニ當時支那本土方面カラハ盛シニ抗日宣傳ヲ行ヒ此ノ敵兵力ノ増加出動ハ南滿地區ノ重大ナル脅威デアリ關東軍トシテハ極メテ軍ノ神經ヲ刺戟シ錦

州方面ノ資源ヲ掃蕩シナケレバナラナイト云フ様ナ意見ヲ有ツニ至ツタ次  
 第デアルマデ。然ル所十一月末第二次天津事變ニ際シ在支天津軍ヨリ兵力  
 派兵ノ要求ガアツタノデ當時馬占山軍主力覆滅後デハアリ對ソ制裁ヲセザ  
 ル限本方針ニモ鑑ミ此方面ヲ減兵シテモ錦州方面ニ兵ヲ進メントシテ準備  
 ヲシマシタガ却ツテ中央統帥部ハ之ヲ抑止シテ來マシタ。當時支那外交當  
 局ヲ通ジテ我々對馬占山附近中立地帶設定問題等ガ提議セラレテ居ツタ  
 様デアリマスガ彼方ガ兵ヲ引キマスト忽チ支那側ガ提議ヲ引込メテシマ  
 ウト云フ様ナ結果デアリマス。兵力過少ニシテ軍事的情勢ガ極メテ不安ノ  
 位置ニ在ル出先對馬占山ノ機先ヲ制シテ所在ノ敵ノ反抗ノ萌芽ヲ叩ク必  
 要ガアツタノデアリマス

關東軍司令官本庄陸軍少將厚ナル人格ニ拘ラズ常に大局ヲ判斷セラレテ少  
 壯輩條ノ積極的意見ニ就テモ十分之ヲ傾聴スルト共に關外ノ重責ヲ一身ニ  
 擔ヒ自ラ穩固ナル決意ヲ以テ命令ヲ發シ大細ニ顧シ指示ヲ與ヘラレマシタ  
 關東軍ハ軍ノ意見ヲシテ屢々積局的ニ具申シ時ニ中央側ニ對シテ論議ヲス  
 ルコトモ屢々アリマスガ、究極ニ於テ軍ノ統帥作戰ニ關シ奉勅



命令ニ背馳シ若クハ奉勅指示ニ違反シタコトハ一回モナカッタコトヲ斷言致シマス

當時關外ノ重任ヲ有スル關東軍司令官ノ行動デ若シ中央統帥部ト軍トノ間ニ何等ノ連絡ガナクシテ行ハレタコトヲ舉ゲレバ次ノ二ツノミデアリマス其ノ一ツハ奉天事件突發ニ伴フ關東軍主力ノ出動デアリマス、併シ之ハ前申シタ通り當時ノ軍事の形勢カラ觀テ本庄將軍ガ關東軍司令部條令第三條並ニ平時ノ作戰準備ニ基イテ其ノ有スル任務權限ヲ發動セラレタモノデアリマス

モウ一ツハ十月八日錦州方面ノ爆撃デアリマスガ之ハ當時錦州方面ニ占據シテヤタ東北軍ノ狀況ヲ偵察スル爲ニ八八式偵察機六機、押收ボテ一キ五機ヲ以テ該地附近ヲ偵察ヒシノマシタ所應射ヲ受ケタノデ自衛上其ノ軍政機關舍デアアル交通大學及二八師ノ兵營並張作相ノ私邸等ニ約七五發ノ爆彈ヲ投下シタニ過デマヒン所ガ此爆彈ハ七糎級山砲位ノ大キサデアリマシタガ完全ナ投彈裝置ガナク手デ投ゲタ様ナ鹽梅デ多少彈丸ガ他ニ散ツタカモシレマヒンガ併シ之ヲ前歐洲大戰ニ於テ獨空軍が行ッタ「ロンドン」爆撃

或ハ今次戦争ニ於ケル米軍「B二九」等ノ日本都市爆撃力、廣島、長崎ニ於ケル原子爆彈投下ノ慘害ニ比シタナクバ殆ンド問題ニナラナイ程デアツタト確信致シマス其他ノ場合ニ於テハ何レモガ中央トヨク意見ヲ戰ハシ若クハ其ノ指示ヲ俟ツテ作戰ヲ開始セラレタ次第デアリマス

殊ニ北滿方面ニ對スル用兵ニ關シテハ中央ノ方針ニ則ツテ對蘇關係ノ全般ニ考慮ヲ加ヘ德國ニ對シテ我方ノ侵略的疑念ヲ抱カセタリ又北滿ニ於ケル彼ノ權益ヲ侵スト云フ様ナコトノナイ爲ニ作戰ノ不利不便ヲ忍ンデモ部隊ノ行動ヲ拘束シタ次第デアリマス

#### 第六滿洲問題解決ト軍事の見解ニ就テ

當時ノ日支間ノ狀態ハ本質ニ於テ支那側ノ國權回復ト我方ノ權益維持トノ相反スル要求ノ衝突デ何レカ一方讓歩スルカ以テ妥協セザル限り解決ハ至難ト認メラレマシタ、從ツテ單ナル外交交渉ニヨツテ日本權益ノ保持ハ到底期シ難ク眞ニ我邦入ノ滿洲ニ於ケル平和的經濟活動ヲ行フ爲ニハ理論的ニハ先方ガ妥協セザル限り滿洲ニ於テ從前我方ノ有スル政治經濟軍事諸般ニ亘ル特殊權益ヲ全部放棄シテ之ヲ解決スル以外ニ方途ハナシタト思

ヒマス、併シ乍ラ當時ノ昭和六年一月ニ於ケル幣原外相ノ議會演說或ハ同年四月若槻總理ノ地方演說ニモ見ラレル如ク我が政府ノ滿蒙ニ期スル所ハ又斯ノ如キ徹底セル方策ヲ斷行シ得ナイノミナラズ我國論ハ之ヲ許シマヒンデシタ、又實際問題トシテハ日本ガ萬一滿洲ヨリ全面的ニ退却シタナラバ單ニ我權益ヲ失ヒ且在滿邦人ヲ死ノ關頭ニ迫ヒ込シテ許リザナク當時既ニ露支紛争ニ於テ承認セラレタ如ク漸ク極東ニ復活シ來レル蘇聯ノ滿洲進出トナリ其ノ傳統ノ政策ニ鑑ミマシテ若シ滿洲ニ蘇聯ガ進出シ赤化ノ資源トナリマシタナラバ滿洲ノ治安ノ確立ヲ得ザルノミナラズ、日本自体ガ其ノ國防ヲ全ウシ得ズ支那亦國防上重大ナル關頭ニ起リモノト謂ハザルヲ得マヒンデシタ

之ヲ日清戰役後ノ狀態ヨリ日露戰爭ノ原因ニ見ルモ明カデアリ殊ニ日露戰爭ニ於テ米英ガ我ヲ支持シタ所以モ亦露國ノ極東侵略ヲ抑止セントスルニ存シタモノト謂ヘマヒウ從ツテ當時ノ關東軍トシテハ我外交方策ニ要求ラシ又ハ之ヲ云々スルトイフコトニツイテハ關係ハナカッタノデアリマスガ事變勃發東北支那軍崩壞ニ直面シマシテ新ナル事態收拾ニ際シテ治安確立

滿洲防衛態勢ノ確立ト云フ點ニハ重大ナル關心ヲ持ツタ次第デアリマス、殊ニ新事態ニ對處シテ對峙防衛態勢ノ確立ガ軍事的ニ觀テ有利デアルト云フコトハ關東軍トシテ關東軍司令官トシテ十分ニ考慮セザルヲ得ナカッタ所デアリマス

併シ勿論對シ防衛ノ確立デアツテ之ヲ基地トシテ對ソ攻勢ヲ企圖スルト云フコトハナカッタノデアリマス、換言スレバ滿洲ノ有利ナル戰略的態勢ヲ活用シテ日支共同ソ聯ノ南下ヲ斷念サス又外交交渉ニ無言ノ支援ヲ與ヘントスルニ外ナラシカッタノデアリマス、滿洲建國ハ右軍事的見解トハ別個ニ東北新政治革命ノ所産トシテ東北軍閥崩壞ノ後ニ創建セラントモノデ我軍進行ハ契機トハナリマシタガ斷ジテ建國ヲ目的トシ若クハ之ヲ手段トシテ行ツタモノデナカッタノデアリマス、又事變解決ニ當リ滿洲ガ支那カラ分離スルト云フコトハ誠ニ情ニ於テ忍ビ得ナイ所デアリマシタガ東亞安定ノ爲ニハ寧ロ滿洲ニ於ケル諸民族ノ趨向ナリ、活動提携ヲ察知シテ多年ニ亘ル紛争ノ禍根ヲ解決スルト云フコトガ軍事的ニモ戰爭ヲ終熄セシメ究極日支提携ニナルモノト感ドラレマシタ、關東軍ハ從ツテ此軍事的見解ニ

基キ速ナル治安ノ確立ニ専念シ占領地行政モ行フコトナク現地官民ニヨル  
 新國家ノ政治經濟等ノ内容ニハ大ナル關心ハアリマセンデシタ、併シ在住  
 諸族ノ民族協和ニヨル紛争ノ除去ト日支共榮ノ爲ニハ日本自体先ツ模範ヲ  
 示シ穩益思想ヲ去リ道義的ニ新ナル構想ヲ以テ滿洲ノ安定ニ寄與スベキデ  
 アルトノ信念ニ基キ特ニ將兵ノ行動ニ自肅自戒ヲ加ヘタ次第デアリマス、  
 建國ガウマクユキマシタ爲役ニ至リ手柄顔ニ建國ハ俺ガヤツタトカ關東軍  
 ト通謀シテ計畫シタトカ、軍官民ノ心ナキ徒蠻ガ色々ト申シマシタガ、滿  
 洲建國自体ハ全ク滿洲ニ於ケル歴史の所産デアリマス民族協和ノ思想ハ今  
 後モ永ク殘ルコトト確信致シマス。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）一月十六日於山形縣

供 述 者 石 原 莞 爾

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ聲明シマス

同日

於同所

立會人 山 田 半 蔵

21



2.12.16

ヲ  
管  
フ

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ施ベ何事ヲモ誤秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコト

宣  
言  
書

(署名  
捺印)

石  
原  
莞  
爾

22